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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
Subrogation of a Municipal Corporation to its Employees'
Rights Against Third Party Tortfeasors
In the case City of Richmond v. Hanes,1 the plaintiff, a police
officer of the city, was injured in the course of his employment
as a result of the negligence of a third party. The city, having
paid the plaintiff's medical bills, sought to recover the amount
it had expended, relying on a provision of the city personnel
rules which provides that such payments constitute an assign-
ment to it of the right to recover damages. After the officer's
claim for damages was settled, the city filed its claim to the
money paid into court by the third party and was made a party
defendant. The trial court ruled that the city was not entitled
to assignment of the plaintiff's claim in the absence of a statute
permitting assignment of personal actions arising ex delicto, and
further, that there were not sufficient grounds to raise subroga-
tion in favor of the city. The Supreme Court of Appeals
affirmed this decision on the same grounds.
The question of the right of a municipal corporation to be
subrogated to a claim of an employee against a third party tort-
feasor has been raised in several other jurisdictions. 2 In the case
of Potoczny to the use of the City of Philadelphia v. Vallejo,3 the
court did not discuss the validity of subrogating a personal tort
claim. Since the city had discharged an obligation primarily
owed by another, it was held that subrogation must take place
in order to prevent unjust enrichment of the obligee.4
1203 Va. 101, 122 S.E.2d 895 (1961).
2 In the only major case of this type (i.e., concerning a public employer)
involving the Federal Government, United States v. Standard Oil Co.,
322 U. S. 301 (1947), the government asked for a direct right of action
against a third party who had injured a soldier. The action was brought
on a master-servant theory and the question of subrogation was not even
in issue, 332 U.S. 301 at 304, Footnote 5. The Supreme Court refused
to "create this new tort liability", contending that if Congress had wanted
such a liability to exist, they would have created it.
3 170 Pa. Super. 377, 85 A.2d 675 (1952).
4 The doctrine of subrogation is generally stated to be--"When property of
one person is used in discharging an obligation owed by another, under
such circumstances that the other would be unjustly enriched by the
benefits thus conferred, the former is entitled to be subrogated to the
position of the obligee . . ." RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 162
(1936).
CASE COMMENTS
The opposite view was taken in the case of Birmingham v.
Walker. r The court, in refusing to grant the right of subroga-
tion to the city, held that the obligation of the city to pay sick
leave benefits to employees for injuries received in the course of
employment did not amount to a "contract of indemnity".
The court contended that this situation is doselyanalogous toan
accident insurance policy in which there can ordinarily be no
subrogation in favor of the insurer.
While the Hanes case reached the same result as the Walker
case, substantially different reasons were given for arriving at
that result. The Virginia Court based its conclusion on three
major points: (1) that in the absence of a validating statute
there can be no assignment of a personal tort claim, 6 (2) that
subrogation is essentially the same remedy as assignment and
therefore its use in a personal tort claim is also invalid, and (3)
that the city was a mere volunteer in making such payments to
its employee and was thus not entitled to subrogation. As to
the first point, it can hardly be questioned that personal tort
claims are not assignable. The second and third points are, how-
ever, open to some discussion.
The authority given by the Virginia Court in arriving at its
second conclusion was a quotation from the California case of
Fifield Manor v. Finston,7 which stated:
While subrogation and assignment have certain techni-
cal differences, each operates to transfer from one person to
another a cause of action against a third, and the reasons of
policy which make certain causes of action nonassignable
would seem to operate as forcefully against the transfer of
such causes of action by subrogation. 8
Neither the Hanes nor the Fifield cases cited any direct authority
supporting this proposition. On the contrary, it would seem
that the authorities hold the opposite view. Assignment is
5267 Ala. 150, 101 So.2d 250 (1958).
6 It was held that the city charter did not grant sufficient authority to the
city to alter the ancient rule against assignability of personal tort actions.
7 54 Cal. 2d 632, 354 P.2d 1073 (1960).
8 Id. at 640, P.2d at 1078.
9 RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 162, comment H (1936).
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held to be a transfer whereas subrogation contemplates only a
substitution. 10 That is to say, assignment involves continued
existence of the claim assignedwhereas subrogation presupposes
actual payment and satisfaction of the claim, although a remedy
is kept alive in equity. " Ostensibly, then, subrogation may
take place under circumstances which would not admit of as-
signment. Thus, in the recent case of Remsen v. Midway
Liquors, Inc.,12 it was held that the rule against assignment of
personal tort claims did not apply to subrogation since subro-
gation is a substitution and not a transfer. The Illinois Court
declared that there were "no public policy reasons for forbid-
ding subrogation in personal injury cases."13
The personal injury insurance analogy used in Birmingham
v. Walker, supra, substantiates rather than refutes this position.
While the intent of the parties in personal injury insurance is
generally held not to be indemnification, that is no indication
that indemnification is not possible in personal injury cases.
Indeed, it is generally held-and the Alabama Court in the
Birmingham case admitted-that there may be subrogation in
personal accident insurance if there is a stipulation so permitting
in thepolicy. 1 4 The holding in the Birmingham case boils down
to the contention that the intent of the parties was not to in-
demnify the employee but to pay certain expenses absolutely in
the event of an injury. It should be noted that in the Hanes
case, unlike the Birmingham case, the city's personnel rules pro-
vided for assignment of the employee's claim, indicating that
the purpose of the city was indemnity, thereby negating the
idea of an absolute promise on the part of the city.
'oWojcuick v. United States, 74 F. Sup. 914 (1947); Reconstruction
Finance Corporation v. Teter, 117 F.2d 716, cert. denied 314 U. S.
620 (1949).
11 Gatewood v. Gatewood, 75 Va. 411 (1881); Kansas City Title & Trust Co.
v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 135 Kan. 414, 10 P.2d 896 (1932); American
Surety Co. v. Bank of California, 133 F.2d 160 (1943); Remsen v.
Midway Liquors, Inc., 30 Ill. App. 2d, 32, 174 N.E.2d 7 (1961).
'
2 Supra note 11.
13 Id. at 12. It should also be noted that all but three of the states (Ohio,
New Hampshire and West Virginia) have incorporated a subrogation
provision into their workmen's compensation laws, indicating that legis-
lative intent favors rather than disapproves of the use of subrogation in
personal injury cases.
14APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE 4931 (1962).
CASE COMMENTS
The third conclusion of the court to the effect that a volun-
teer is not entitled to subrogation is indisputable as a general
proposition of law. 15 However, it is at least arguable that in
the present case the city was not a "volunteer" at all. Although
the city was a "volunteer" in the sense that it voluntarily pro-
vided for the payment of sick leave and medical expenses in its
personnel rules, 1 6 it would certainly seem that the rule, once
made, would be binding upon the city. Thus, when the city
made these payments to Hanes, it was acting pursuant to a
legal obligation, even though the obligation was voluntarily
created.
The question then resolves itself to "exactly who is a 'volun-
teer'?" It is said that "the term 'volunteer' as an exception or
limitation should be narrowly and strictly construed to the end
that the doctrine [subrogation] may be expansively and liber-
ally applied".17 Decisions in the United States are virtually
unanimous in declaring the liberal and broad application of the
doctrine of subrogation.8 It would appear, then, that there is
substantial reason for contending that the city was more than a
t mere volunteer".
The effect of the decision in this case is to award the em-
ployee a double recovery for a single injury, thus violating a
basic tenet of the common law.19 Unless a statute is passed
changing the present state of affairs, it is difficult to perceive
how this difficulty can be avoided. 2o The city is faced with the
dilemma of either not paying for its policeman's medical ex-
penses-incurred in the line of duty-or else awarding him a
double recovery in many instances. If the city cannot utilize
either the assignment or subrogation theories to reimburse it-
self, it cannot effectively indemnify its employees against pecu-
niary loss resulting from personal injury.
S.W.M.
'5 POMEROY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, 2343 (2d ed. 1905).
16 Section 303, Clause 8, Personnel Rules of the City of Richmond.
17 Boney v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 213 N.C. 563, 197 S.E.2d 122 (1961).
Is See generally 83 C.J.S. Subrogation § 5b (1955).
10 For an excellent discussion of the undesirability of a double recovery in
cases of this type, see Geneva Construction Co. et al. v. Martin Transfer
and Storage Co., 41 Ill.2d 73, 122 N.E.2d 540 (1954).
20 The Virginia Workmen's Compensation Law exempts policemen and firemen
in municipalities with populations exceeding 230,000 from coverage.
Therefore the city cannot avail itself of the subrogation provision
in that statute. VA. CODE ANN. § 65-4 (1950) (Additional Supp.
1956).
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